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[1339] 
Tobriner Memorial Lecture:  
Free Speech on Campus 
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY* 
On February 1, 2017, Milo Yiannopoulos was scheduled to speak on 
the University of California, Berkeley campus. The Chancellor, Nicholas 
Dirks, worried that there might be disruptions. He asked for all of the 
other U.C. campuses to send additional police. He asked the Berkeley 
Police Force to help out. 
Notwithstanding all of the plans with respect to security, Antifa 
came and created great disruption on campus, breaking windows, 
throwing Molotov cocktails. The vandalism cost the campus over 
$100,000. Chancellor Dirks believed that there was no way to allow 
Yiannopoulos to speak and be able to protect the safety of those on 
campus. He canceled Yiannopoulos’ appearance.  
Chancellor Dirks was widely criticized for doing so. It was said that 
he had suppressed free speech. In fact, two days later on Friday morning, 
President Donald Trump tweeted that unless U.C. Berkeley was willing 
to protect free speech, it should lose all federal funds.1  
On Thursday, September 21, 2017, Ben Shapiro spoke on the U.C. 
Berkeley campus. The Chancellor, Carol Christ, took extensive 
precautions to ensure security. The campus spent $600,000 to make 
sure that Shapiro could speak without violent disruption. 
It was successful. Shapiro spoke in Zellerbach Hall. There were no 
incidents. Three days later, on Sunday, September 24th, Milo 
Yiannopoulos again spoke on campus. This time his appearance was less 
than fifteen minutes, though once more, it cost the campus several 
hundred thousand dollars in order to allow Yiannopoulos to speak 
without disruption. It now is estimated that the campus spent over 
 
 * Dean and Jesse H. Choper Distinguished Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley 
School of Law. Remarks delivered as the Tobriner Memorial Lecture at University of California, 
Hastings College of the Law, November 1, 2017. 
 1. Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Feb. 2, 2017, 3:13 AM), 
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/827112633224544256?lang=en.  
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almost $4 million so as to secure free speech while also protecting the 
safety of students, staff, and faculty. 
Issues of free speech on campus are nothing new. They have been 
around as long as there have been colleges and universities. In fact, the 
U.C. Berkeley has played a key role with regard to the development of 
free speech principles on campus. It was the free speech movement there, 
in the mid-1960s, that established the ability of students to use campuses 
as the place for expressing views not just with regard what is going on in 
the university, but with regard to political issues as well. 
And yet, things seem different in some ways from what was going on 
in the free speech movement in the 1960s. Now, it is often outside 
speakers who want to use the campus as their platform: Milo 
Yiannopoulos, Ann Coulter, Ben Shapiro. It is often outside groups, like 
Antifa, that want to disrupt the speech. There are other differences as 
well. The attitude of students with regard to free speech seems different 
now than it was in the 1960s. 
I do not want to overgeneralize. There is certainly a divergence of 
opinion amongst students, but there are more students and more faculty 
now who want to suppress hateful speech than we might have seen fifty 
years ago. I have many examples to illustrate this. The last two years I 
taught an undergraduate class at the University of California, Irvine, on 
free speech on campus. I did this together with the Chancellor, Howard 
Gillman. 
We began each topic by posing for our students a problem, most 
always based on a real event, and then polling our students as to how they 
would come out on the matter. We began the first class with an incident 
that occurred at the University of Oklahoma, in March of 2015.  
You might have read about it. You might have even watched the 
video. It was a group of fraternity members on a bus going to a formal 
event. Only fraternity members were on the bus and they were all dressed 
in formal wear. Two members of the fraternity led the others on the bus 
in a deeply offensive racist chant. The chant even spoke of lynching in a 
positive way. A member of the fraternity on the bus used his cell phone 
to take a video of it. The video quickly went viral. When the president of 
the University of Oklahoma, David Boren, saw the video, he immediately 
expelled the two students from the university. He suspended the 
fraternity from operating on campus.  
We asked our students if the two expelled individuals had sued 
President Boren and the University of Oklahoma, who should win: the 
students based on free speech or the University of Oklahoma? Not one 
student among ours, two years in a row, was willing to take the free 
speech position. Both years, all of the students said the university should 
CHEMERINSKY-69.5 (DO NOT DELETE) 6/3/2018  1:27 PM 
June 2018] FREE SPEECH ON CAMPUS 1341 
be able to punish the speech. Now, in reality, had the expelled students 
sued, I have no doubt that they would have won. 
In early September 2017, Chancellor Christ held a faculty panel with 
a large audience at U.C. Berkeley in anticipation of the so-called 
“scheduled free speech week.” The auditorium was packed. 
One of the members of the faculty panel said that the Chancellor 
should not allow speakers like Milo Yiannopoulos or others expressing 
hate to come onto campus. There was huge applause from the audience. 
During the question and answer period, a number of students said that it 
did not matter what the law said, or what the First Amendment required, 
Chancellor Christ should not allow hateful speakers on campus. Again, 
there was resounding applause. 
I was a panel member and near the end of the program I spoke up 
as a lawyer and as a law professor, and I said:  
Be clear. If Chancellor Christ would try to keep Milo Yiannopoulos or a 
hateful speaker off campus, she would get sued, she would lose. When 
Auburn tried to exclude white supremacist, Richard Spencer, he sued and 
he won. The excluded speaker would get an injunction to secure the ability 
to come and speak on campus. 
I explained: “the campus would have to pay the excluded speaker’s 
attorney’s fees, maybe even Chancellor Christ would have to pay money 
damages because she is violating clearly established law.” I said, “the 
excluded speaker would then be portrayed in the media as a victim, as a 
martyr, and absolutely nothing would be gained. The speaker still would 
be able to appear.” No one applauded when I said that. 
The Pew Research Institute did a survey, this was two years ago, of 
college undergraduates and over forty percent expressed the view that 
colleges should be able to exclude and punish speech that they regard as 
offensive or hateful.2  
There is another thing that has changed over the last year. I have the 
sense that just over the last year, a rock has been turned over and things 
that previously would not have been said in public are now being 
expressed. I can give a couple of examples. Did you read some of the signs 
that were held up in Charlottesville? For example, one of the signs said, 
and I am quoting verbatim, “[k]ikes belong in the oven.” I am sixty-four 
years old, and I do not remember ever seeing a sign saying that held up 
in public. In September 2017, Harvard Law Professor Alan Dershowitz 
came and spoke at Berkeley Law. He spoke without incident; it was tense, 
and hard questions were asked of him, but it was a completely 
appropriate academic discussion. 
 
 2. Jacob Poushter, 40% of Millennials OK with Limiting Speech Offensive to Minorities, PEW 
RES. CTR. (Nov. 20, 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/11/20/40-of-millennials-ok-
with-limiting-speech-offensive-to-minorities. 
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Afterwards, that afternoon, someone drew a swastika on a poster of 
Dershowitz that was on a bulletin board in the law school. I have been a 
law professor for thirty-eight years, but I have never taught in a building 
where somebody put a swastika on the wall. This is part of the context 
when talking about free speech on campus.  
It is important in discussing free speech on campus to separate what 
the current law is and what the law should be. Both are important 
conversations to have, but I want to especially focus on the former. I will 
articulate what I see as the three governing principles for free speech on 
campus, and then apply those principles to the cutting-edge issues that 
are coming up now. 
 First, all ideas and views can be expressed on a college campus, 
period. Now obviously here I’m focusing on public universities because 
that’s where the First Amendment applies. I would make the argument 
that private universities should be just as committed to freedom of 
speech, even though the Constitution does not require it. An academic 
institution exists for the advancement of ideas and that requires that all 
ideas can be articulated and discussed. That is the core principle of 
academic freedom and it is just as important at private universities as at 
public ones. 
 When it comes to the First Amendment, the Supreme Court has said 
above all it means that the government never can prevent speech or 
punish speech based on the idea or the view expressed. Viewpoint 
discrimination, as the Supreme Court sometimes describes it, is never 
allowed under the First Amendment. 
This is true even when the view or idea is offensive, including deeply 
offensive. To illustrate this, consider a Supreme Court case from earlier 
this decade, Snyder v. Phelps.3 Snyder involves a small church out of 
Topeka, Kansas, the Westboro Baptist church. The church’s members 
make a practice of going to funerals of those who died in military service 
and using the funerals as occasions for expressing a very vile, anti-gay, 
anti-lesbian message.  
Matthew Snyder died while in military service as a marine in Iraq. 
The members of the Westboro Baptist church traveled from Kansas to 
Maryland, where the funeral was being held. Before the funeral, the 
members of the church asked the police officers where they could lawfully 
stand. The officers pointed to an area about a thousand feet away from 
where the funeral ceremony was going to take place. Before the funeral, 
the members of the church chanted and sang. During the funeral, they 
were silent but held up signs. 
 
 3. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 458 (2011). 
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That night, Matthew’s father, Albert, watched the news and read 
those signs. He was deeply offended. He sued the members of the 
Westboro Baptist Church for intentional infliction of emotional distress 
and invasion of privacy. A jury awarded Albert over $10 million in 
damages.4 The United States Supreme Court, eight to one, ruled that the 
members of the Westboro Baptist Church could not be held liable. Chief 
Justice Roberts wrote the opinion for the Court. Above all, he stressed 
that the government never can punish speech or hold speakers liable on 
the grounds that the speech is offensive, even if it is deeply offensive. 
Second, free speech is not absolute; indeed, there are categories of 
unprotected speech. The idea that free speech is not absolute is familiar 
to all of us. Long ago, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes famously said, 
“[t]he most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man 
in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic.”5 At least since 
1942, in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, the Supreme Court said that 
there are categories of unprotected speech.6 For instance, child 
pornography is a category of unprotected speech. The government can 
prohibit its sale and distribution and even punish private possession in 
the home. False and deceptive advertising is another category of 
unprotected speech.  
There are three categories of unprotected speech that are relevant to 
the conversation about free speech on campus. 
The first is incitement of illegal activity. The test under current law 
with respect to incitement of illegal activity, comes from Brandenburg  
v. Ohio, in 1969.7 There, the Supreme Court said that the government can 
punish advocacy if there is a substantial likelihood of imminent illegal 
activity and if the speech is directed at causing imminent illegal activity. 
Imagine an angry group on campus. Imagine a speaker says to them, 
“[l]et’s go break windows. Let’s commit acts of vandalism to express our 
message.” I think in that context, a judge or a jury could reasonably find 
that meets the test for incitement and the speech can be punished.  
But it cannot be punished as incitement when an audience reacts 
against the speaker. Incitement, as defined by the Supreme Court, has 
always been when the speaker exhorts the audience to commit acts of 
violence.8 If the audience reacts against the speaker, that is not enough 
to constitute incitement. I have heard many people say that Milo 
 
 4. Westboro Baptist Church was held liable for 2.9 million dollars in compensatory damages and 
8 million dollars in punitive damages, but the punitive damages award was subsequently remitted to 
2.1 million dollars. Id.  
 5. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). 
 6. 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942). 
 7. 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). 
 8. Id. at 448. 
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Yiannopoulos should not be protected by the First Amendment because 
he is a provocateur. He wants the audience to react against him.  
But I then point out that Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. was a 
provocateur also. He very much wanted the police and crowds to react 
against the civil rights demonstrators. In fact, he was disappointed when 
there was no reaction against him because it would not get media 
attention. The civil rights demonstrations often put children at the very 
front so when the police came with the billy clubs and firehouses that is 
what would be shown on the nightly news. 
We cannot say that because somebody is labeled a provocateur, they 
lose First Amendment protection. The definition of incitement as a 
matter of law is therefore, as with all these categories, different from the 
colloquial use of the phrase.  
A second category of unprotected speech is what the Supreme Court 
has called “true threats.” The phrase “true threats,” comes from the 
Supreme Court in the 1960’s case Watts v. United States. 
The case involved a federal law that makes it a federal crime to 
threaten the President of the United States.9 The Supreme Court said if 
it is a true threat, then that is not speech protected by the First 
Amendment. But the Court stressed that it is important to distinguish a 
true threat from mere hyperbole. On other occasions, the Court has 
reaffirmed that speech that rises to the level of a true threat is not 
protected by the First Amendment.  
The Court has done very little to clarify the definition of true threat. 
There is a split among the federal circuits as to whether it should be an 
objective test. Would a reasonable person fear imminent danger to 
physical safety? Or should there be a subjective requirement, that the 
speaker desired to cause somebody to fear imminent danger to physical 
safety? I personally would prefer the Court take the objective approach. 
I do not think there should be a First Amendment right to cause a person 
to reasonably fear danger to his or her physical safety. But it is an 
unsettled area of law. 
Imagine that a student is walking across a campus and an angry 
group surrounds that student and yells at the student in a way that makes 
the student reasonably fear a threat to his or her physical safety. I do not 
think that is speech that should be protected by the First Amendment.  
A third category of speech that is unprotected, relevant to free 
speech on campus, is harassment. There is very little law regarding when 
speech on a campus rises to the level of harassment so that it can be 
punished. But there is a good deal of law with respect to harassment in 
the workplace. The Supreme Court has held for decades that sexual 
 
 9. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 705 (1969) (per curiam). 
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harassment is a form of sex discrimination that violates Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964.10 Likewise, courts have held, that harassment on 
the basis of race violates federal employment discrimination laws. There 
are similar cases here in California regarding California statutes that 
prohibit discrimination. 
In the context of employment, courts have said is that in order to 
constitute harassment beyond the quid pro quo context, speech has to 
create a hostile or intimidating work environment.11 The courts have said 
that it has to be directed at a [particular] person or so pervasive as to 
materially interfere with employment opportunities on the basis of a 
characteristic like race, sex, religion, or sexual orientation.12 We are now 
starting to see the first cases applying this definition in the campus 
context. 
Of course, what the cases show is that there is a difference between 
the colloquial use of the term harassment and the legal definition of 
harassment. I heard students on the U.C. Berkeley campus say that they 
felt harassed just by the mere presence on the campus of speakers like 
Milo Yiannopoulos and Ann Coulter. That cannot be enough to meet the 
test for harassment. I think with respect to speech, as with employment, 
the speech has to either be directed at somebody or so pervasive as to 
materially interfere with educational opportunities on the basis of a 
protected category like race, sex, religion, or sexual orientation. 
To contrast some examples, there was an incident at U.C. San Diego, 
in which somebody put over a tree branch what appeared to be a noose. 
I do not think that, by itself, would meet the definition of harassment. 
Compare that, however, to somebody tacking on the dormitory door of 
an African American student what would appear to be a noose. I think 
that would be harassment that could be punished. But as with what is a 
true threat, the law has not developed sufficiently as to exactly when 
speech crosses the line to harassment that can be punished.  
I have described the main categories of unprotected speech that the 
Supreme Court has identified that are relevant to the discussion of 
campuses: incitement, true threats, and harassment. You will notice what 
I did not list a category of unprotected speech: hate speech. The Supreme 
Court has been clear that hate speech generally is protected under the 
First Amendment.13  
I have so often in the last two months been asked by reporters, and 
by students, what is the distinction between free speech and hate speech? 
 
 10. See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
 11. Id. at 65. 
 12. Id.  
 13. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992). 
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The answer is, under current law, there is no distinction. Hate speech is 
protected as a form of free speech. You might remember that in the late 
1970s and the early 1980s, the Nazi Party wanted to march in Skokie, 
Illinois.14 Skokie is a suburb of Chicago, which, at the time, was a 
predominantly Jewish suburb and had a large number of Holocaust 
survivors. 
The Nazi party obviously intentionally chose Skokie as the place for 
their demonstration. Skokie tried everything it could to keep the Nazi 
Party from being able to march there. But every court, including the 
Supreme Court, held that the Nazis had the right to march even though 
their message was violent and hateful.15  
Another example of the protection of hate speech is the Supreme 
Court’s decision in 1992, R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul. St. Paul, Minnesota 
adopted an ordinance that prohibited painting a swastika or burning a 
cross, both vile symbols of hate, in a manner likely to “anger, alarm, or 
cause resentment.”16 The Supreme Court unanimously declared that 
ordinance unconstitutional, clearly indicating that these symbols of hate 
are protected by the First Amendment.17  
Another example was a case in 2003, Virginia v. Black. It involved 
a Virginia statute that essentially prohibited cross burning.18 The 
Supreme Court ruled, eight to one, that cross burning, despite its vile 
history, is speech protected by the First Amendment unless it rises to the 
level of, what I mentioned earlier, a true threat.  
In saying that hate speech is protected by the First Amendment, I do 
not, in any way, discount the harms of such expression. Scholars such as 
Mari Matsuda, Charles Lawrence, and Richard Delgado have eloquently 
described the adverse effects of hate speech and how it causes students 
who have traditionally been underrepresented on campuses to feel 
unwelcome. These scholars have spoken eloquently about the 
psychological harms of hate speech.  
And yet I think it is easy to understand why the Supreme Court has 
consistently said that hate speech is protected by the First Amendment. 
Some of it is the problem with defining what is hate speech in a manner 
that is not unduly vague or overbroad. Any government regulation of 
speech, including by a public university, has to be clear about what is 
prohibited and what is allowed. It cannot be vague. It cannot be 
overbroad and regulate substantially more speech than the Constitution 
 
 14. See Nat’l Socialist Party of Am. v. Vill. of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977) (per curiam). 
 15. Id. at 44. 
 16. See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 379. 
 17. Id. at 381. 
 18. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 347, 348 (2003). 
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allows to be regulated. Yet it has proven impossible to try to define what 
is hate speech in a way that is not impermissibly vague and overbroad.  
In the early 1990s, over 350 colleges and universities adopted  
so-called “hate speech” codes. Each one challenged in court was declared 
unconstitutional, without exception.19 They were almost always declared 
unconstitutional on vagueness and overbreadth grounds. One of the 
most famous involved the University of Michigan. There were a number 
of ugly racist incidents on the Michigan campus. Out of the most laudable 
motives, the campus adopted a hate speech code. It prohibited speech 
that stigmatized or demeaned on the basis of race, sex, or religion.  
But what does it mean for speech to stigmatize or demean? A 
sociobiology graduate student brought a challenge and said that he was 
doing research about whether there were inherent differences between 
men and women. He was worried that his research might be found to 
stigmatize or demean on the basis of sex.  
Almost every European country has a hate speech law, and I do not 
think there is a single one of them that could withstand a vagueness or 
overbreadth challenge in the United States. Most of them use language 
like the Michigan code, prohibiting speech that stigmatizes or demeans 
based on race sex, religion, or sexual orientation.  
In fact, experience under the hate speech codes and the hate speech 
laws in Europe should give us pause about wanting such laws and codes 
in the United States. Most frequently, such codes and laws have been 
used against the very groups they are meant to protect. After the 
University of Michigan adopted its hate speech code, before it was struck 
down in Doe v. University of Michigan, every single enforcement action 
sought under it was against African-American and Latino students. 
When England adopted its hate speech law, the initial prosecution under 
it was against the Zionist group. The prosecutor argued that Zionism was 
a form of racism under a United Nation’s resolution. France has a very 
strict hate speech law. One of the most frequently prosecuted individuals 
under it is the actress Brigitte Bardot, for her animal rights activism.  
But maybe most of all, the Supreme Court and the lower courts have 
said that hate speech is protected by the First Amendment because it 
expresses an idea. All ideas and views are protected by the First 
Amendment, no matter how vile or offensive. Justice John Marshall 
Harlan said, in Cohen v. California, that to censor words is to censor 
ideas; we cannot cleanse the English language to please “the most 
squeamish among us.”20  
 
 19. See, e.g., 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989). 
 20. 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971). 
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Third, campuses can have time, place, and manner restrictions, so 
long as they leave open adequate alternative places for communication. 
Even when there is a right to use government property for speech, it does 
not mean that it has to be there at all times for speech, or every part of it 
has to be there, for all manners of expression. 
For example, there is a right to use public streets for speech, but 
there is no First Amendment right to hold a demonstration down the 
middle of a freeway at rush hour. The idea of time, place, and manner 
restrictions is well established in First Amendment jurisprudence. 
Campuses can use time, place, and manner restrictions so as to prevent 
disruption of campus activities and to protect safety. For instance, a 
campus can say, there cannot be major demonstrations in or near 
classroom buildings during the time that classes are in session. 
Campuses can have free speech zones so long as they leave adequate 
alternative places for communication. I was asked by a Vice Chancellor 
at U.C. Berkeley, “couldn’t the campus just have all the speech activities 
on the Lawrence campus several miles away?” I said, “No, I don’t think 
any court would uphold that as leaving adequate alternative places for 
communication.”  
I think it is also important to emphasize that campuses can have 
time, place, and manner restrictions so as to ensure safety. Campuses 
have the legal as well as the ethical duty to ensure the safety of students, 
staff, and faculty. When Chancellor Christ asked my advice with regard 
to what the campus should do, I said, “have the most controversial 
speakers in an auditorium, rather than in an open area of campus.” If the 
speech is an auditorium, the campus can require tickets or ID, can have 
metal detectors to detect people having weapons, and can have police 
there to avert disruption by securing the perimeter. If the speech is in the 
open on campus, none of that is possible. I think having a speaker in a 
large auditorium, rather than an open area, is a permissible time, place, 
manner restriction. When Ben Shapiro came and spoke on campus, it 
was not down Sproul Plaza in the middle of campus; it was in the 
Zellerbach Auditorium, the largest auditorium on campus. That is a 
permissible time, place, manner restriction. 
I think one of the hard issues that the law does not provide guidance 
on is: how much money does a campus have to spend in order to secure 
a controversial speakers’ ability to appear? There is certainly some law in 
terms of what the government can do with respect to charges imposed on 
speakers. The government, for example, cannot have discretion in setting 
the amount of the fee. In Nationalist Movement v. Forsyth County, the 
Court said that the government cannot, through its officials, have 
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discretion in setting amount of a permit fee.21 The fear then is that with 
such discretion government will charge a high fee if it does not like the 
speaker, and a lower fee if it likes the speaker. Such discretion involves 
too great a risk of viewpoint discrimination. 
Also, the charges cannot be so large so as to effectively keep the 
speaker from appearing. Skokie tried to require the Nazis to post a large 
insurance bond to be able to speak.22 The courts declared that 
unconstitutional. U.C. Berkeley could not have said to Ben Shapiro, 
“you’re welcome to come speak but you’ll have to pay $600,000 for 
security.” That would have kept him from speaking.  
There can be a point in which a campus can say “we can’t safely allow 
this speaker to appear; therefore, we need to cancel the appearance.” It 
should always be a last resort. It can never be based on a viewpoint. But 
there is a paramount obligation to protect the safety of students, staff, 
and faculty. Chancellor Christ asked me the question of, “how much does 
the campus have to spend in order to protect speech?” 
I said the law is unclear on this. I said that if I were your lawyer, I 
would say that the campus has to spend a reasonable amount in order to 
protect speech. But the law is unclear on defining what is reasonable or 
the point at which a campus can refuse to allow a speaker because it 
cannot afford the costs of security. I said to Chancellor Christ that I 
thought she needed to focus on two questions. First, what is your 
stomach for litigation? If the campus excludes a speaker saying, “we can’t 
afford the security,” the campus is going to get sued. Does the campus 
want to litigate? If it loses, it will have to pay attorneys’ fees and maybe 
even damages. Second, what do you want your public message to be?  
Now, Chancellor Christ decided she wanted the public message to 
be that U.C. Berkeley is a free speech campus and decided to spend 
almost $4 million. But what if Milo Yiannopoulos said, not that this is 
going to be a free speech week, but it is going to be a free speech 
semester? Every week there are going to be speakers like him and Ann 
Coulter and Ben Shapiro. What if the cost was $60 million rather than 
$4 million? At what point can the campus say, we just cannot afford it 
anymore? The law does not provide an answer. 
These are the three principles that I think have to guide analysis with 
respect to speech on campus. 
I want to apply them to some of the cutting-edge issues that are 
arising. Let me quickly talk about five: disruption of speakers, safe 
spaces, trigger warnings, microaggressions, and the Internet.  
 
 21. 505 U.S. 123, 137 (1992). 
 22. Vill. of Skokie v. Nat’l Socialist Party, 373 N. E. 2d 21 (Ill. 1965). 
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With regard to disruption of speakers, one of the things that we are 
increasingly seeing is those who dislike a speaker are reacting against the 
speaker by engaging in disruptive activity. In the fall of 2017, President 
Michael Schill of the University of Oregon attempted to give an address 
on the state of the campus and student protesters disrupted so loudly that 
President Schill could not deliver his remarks. The week before that, an 
attorney for the ACLU (American Civil Liberties Union) was speaking at 
William and Mary Law School and protesters came and disrupted her 
and chanted so loudly that she could not be heard. 
Several years ago, at U.C. Irvine, Israeli Ambassador Michael Oren 
was scheduled to speak and a student stood up and yelled so he could not 
be heard. That student was escorted out and then another student stood 
up and yelled so he could not be heard. Altogether eleven students did 
this though, ultimately Ambassador Oren was able to speak.  
Each time this occurs, I hear people say, “well those who engage in 
such disruptive activity are themselves just speaking, and so what they’re 
doing is protected by the First Amendment.” I think that is wrong. I do 
not think the First Amendment provides the right to use speech to 
interfere with an invited speaker’s ability to deliver a message. There is 
no right for somebody to come in as I was delivering this address and yell 
so I could not be heard. There is no right to come into my class and 
scream so I cannot teach. There is no right to go into any of these 
activities and disrupt. Otherwise, somebody would be able to speak only 
if there was not an audience that cared enough to disrupt the speech 
activity. Otherwise, there would always be a heckler’s veto.  
The week that the Ambassador Oren incident happened, I wrote an 
op-ed in the LA Times saying that the disrupters were not protected by 
the First Amendment in what they were doing.23 Now I think the 
punishment for such activity should fit the offense. I think it should be 
university discipline. I do not favor criminal prosecution, unless there is 
a threat to safety or a threat to physical property, but I do not think it is 
speech that is protected by the First Amendment. 
There is now a movement that says that campuses should be a 
platform for hateful speakers. You might have even heard this phrase, 
“no platform.” This is effectuated by denying a platform by disrupting the 
speakers. But the disrupters, even though what they are doing is just 
speech, are not protected by the First Amendment.  
 
 23. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Opinion, UC Irvine’s Free Speech Debate: Students and Others Who 
Disrupted an Address by the Israeli Ambassador to the U.S. Can’t Claim 1st Amendment Rights, L.A. 
TIMES (Feb. 18, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/feb/18/opinion/la-oe-chemerinsky18-
2010feb18. 
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The second concept I wanted to talk about is “safe spaces.” This 
phrase is so much in vogue now. I heard it all the time on the U.C. 
Berkeley campus in September 2017 with students saying campuses have 
to be safe spaces. I think it is very important to be clear about what we 
mean by safe spaces. Some uses of the phrase are not only not 
objectionable, they are laudable. Some I think are objectionable. Safe 
spaces might mean the obligation of the campus to protect the physical 
safety of students, staff, and faculty. As I have already said, I believe 
campuses have the legal and the ethical duty to do so.  
Safe spaces might mean a place of repose. We all need a place to go 
where we can get away from it all. In Frisby v. Schultz, the Supreme Court 
said the government can protect peoples’ homes as a place of repose.24 I 
think dormitories for college students are a place of repose. I think 
campuses can create much greater restrictions on speech in dormitories 
than in public areas of the campus, so long as the restrictions are 
viewpoint neutral. 
Safe spaces might refer to the obligation of a professor to make sure 
that a classroom is a place where students feel safe and comfortable 
expressing views. I always want my classroom to be a place where 
students feel comfortable expressing any idea and know that they will be 
treated with respect by me and by the fellow students.  
But there is another meaning of safe spaces that I find objectionable, 
and that is the idea that students should be protected on campus from 
ideas and views that they find objectionable. I have heard many students 
at U.C. Berkeley in the last two months say that the campuses should not 
host hateful speakers because it makes them feel unsafe. That cannot be 
a basis for campus punishing or preventing speech. Part of being on a 
college campus is being exposed to ideas that might make us feel 
uncomfortable, even offend us. 
A third concept that I want to talk about is “trigger warnings.” 
Trigger warnings are where a professor warns students before material is 
to be covered that it might be offensive. I was giving trigger warnings long 
before I heard this phrase. When Chancellor Gilman and I read to our 
students the racist chant from the bus at the University of Oklahoma, 
before doing so, we told our students that it was deeply offensive and 
racist. As long as I have been teaching First Amendment law, I have 
always played for my students the George Carlin monologue on the seven 
dirty words in teaching the Supreme Court case about it, FCC  
v. Pacifica.25 I do not think you can understand the case without hearing 
the monologue. But I have always warned my students that it is about five 
 
 24. 487 U.S. 474, 485 (1988). 
 25. See 558 U.S. 310 (1978). 
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minutes, it is filled with profanities and sexual innuendo, and they were 
free to leave for the next five minutes if they wanted to. No one actually 
has gotten up and left, but I have done a trigger warning. I have no 
problem with professors giving trigger warnings. 
My objection is if a college or university were to require faculty to 
give trigger warnings. There have been proposals at U.C. Santa Barbara 
and at Oberlin College to require that faculty give trigger warnings before 
covering material that might be offensive to students. I think a key part 
of the First Amendment is academic freedom. I think that professors 
have a right to choose how to best teach the material in their courses. A 
professor may think that a trigger warning is the best way to approach 
the material, but a professor also might think the students are better off 
covering it without a trigger warning. That has to be up to the individual 
professor. 
A fourth concept that’s much discussed is microaggressions. 
Microaggressions are things that are said to a person that are offensive, 
but without the intent to offend. It is saying something to a person that 
causes offense on the basis of race, or sex, or religion, or sexual 
orientation, but the speaker is usually unaware that it is going to cause 
the offense. 
I think that colleges and universities have the obligation to educate 
their students about what others might find to be microaggressions. I 
think it is important at orientation sessions and other kinds of programs 
for colleges or universities to help their students understand what might 
offend others. Now, when I have said this in other contexts, I have been 
accused of favoring political correctness. I strongly disagree with that 
criticism. We all learn from a young age that there are certain things you 
do not say in public, certain things you do not say to other people. I think 
educating students with regard to what others might find to be 
microaggressions is just about that. 
A fifth area concerns the internet. I think that the law has least kept 
up with the problems of the Internet with regard to campuses. I believe 
that in the years ahead the hardest questions with regard to free speech 
on campus are going to involve the Internet. Traditionally, the focus 
about free speech in educationwhether it is at the high school level or 
the college levelhas been about expression at the school or on the 
campus. But the Internet is different: it is a student in an apartment at 
home, any place, on a smartphone, on the Internet and the student (or 
professor) might be saying things that are harmful, harassing, to other 
students. 
I think that the internet is the most powerful medium for 
communication to be developed since the printing press. It has 
tremendously democratized the ability to reach a mass audience. It used 
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to be that to reach a mass audience a person had to be rich enough to own 
a newspaper or get a broadcast license. Now, anybody who has a 
smartphone, even just access to a modem in a public library, can reach a 
mass audience. But that then raises unprecedented ability to use speech 
for harm. 
What we see now, on some campuses, is a practice that has been 
called “doxing.” Previously, the law would refer to doxing as public 
disclosure of private facts: where very private information is put on the 
internet about somebody, such as the fact that a person is undocumented 
or transgender. The traditional answer of the law is that the person whose 
privacy has been invaded can sue for money damages for the tort of 
public disclosure of private facts. 
That seems so inadequate. The person whose privacy is invaded does 
not want to bring a lawsuit and does not want to call more attention to 
this. What can campuses do in this regard particularly if it is other 
students, but also if it is outside speakers? We now know so many 
incidents on campus, of the Internet being used to harass particular 
students. Studies have shown that the students who are harassed are 
much more likely to be women, much more likely to be students of color. 
How do we deal with this in terms of how campuses can regulate or 
punish speech? 
I have tried to describe for you the law of the First Amendment. I 
have tried to talk about how it can be applied to some of these  
cutting-edge issues, but so much when we talk about free speech, should 
not be about the law at all. At the beginning of the semester, I sent a note 
out to the entire law school community at U.C. Berkeley, talking about 
the importance of speech and the importance of tolerance, but I also said 
that just because the First Amendment protects a right to say something 
does not mean that it should be said. Also, when hateful incidents occur 
on campus, one of the most important things that college or university 
administrators can do is respond with more speech.26 
I think Justice Brandeis got it exactly right when he said, the best 
remedy for the speech we don’t like is “more speech, not enforced 
silence.” When I say this I know that more speech cannot cure the pain 
of hateful speech. But more speech in the context of a college or 
university can proclaim the principles of community that we aspire to live 
by. The morning after the swastika was drawn over Alan Dershowitz’s 
picture, I sent a note to everybody in the law school community strongly 
condemning such hate speech, trying to explain why it is inconsistent 
with the community we are and that we aspire to be. 
 
 26. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (concurring opinion). 
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Not long ago, I heard the general counsel of the University of 
Mississippi speaking out: whenever there is a hateful incident on that 
campus, given its history, the president always responds with more 
speech. The general counsel simply believed that it is really quite 
important for the nature of that university, given its history, and the 
community that it seeks to be.  
Ultimately, for free speech on campus and in society, it is important 
to remember that we do not need free speech for the speech we like, we 
would naturally allow that to occur. We need free speech for the speech 
that we detest. 
It is about the faith that the only way that our speech will be free 
tomorrow is to safeguard speech that we do not like today. It is based on 
the faith that ultimately, good ideas will triumph over bad ones, and the 
most horrible things espoused will not come to reality. I usually have that 
faith, but I certainly have moments of doubt too. Free speech poses many 
problems, but I believe that giving campus officials the power to punish 
expression would be much worse. 
 
